Daines-Merkley Rules Reform Analysis
Steve Daines, R-Mont., and Jeff Merkley, D-Ore., recently unveiled a package of rule changes designed to speed up the Senate’s legislative process and facilitate its consideration of bipartisan bills and amendments. Their proposal - “To Save the Senate” - recommends reforms to the Senate’s standing rules in four areas:
Cloture
Suspension of the Rules
Authorizing Legislation
Appropriations Legislation
Taken together, the proposed changes are intended to “increase the Senate’s capacity to process legislation, increase amendments considered on the floor, and strengthen the power of committees.” Daines-Merkley does so by empowering committee chairs and ranking members (along with a handful of their colleagues) to bring committee-reported legislation to the Senate floor under procedures that limit debate and amendments.
Cloture
Daines-Merkley recommends three cloture-related rule changes:
Eliminate Cloture on Certain Questions
Eliminate the Intervening Day
Reduce Post-Cloture Debate Time
Taken together, the proposed changes aim to “expand the time for debate on more legislation by reducing the time spent closing debate.”
Eliminate Cloture on Certain Questions
Eliminate cloture on nominations, motions to proceed, and amendments.
The proposal does not specify how this rule change would operate. It also says nothing about how senators would end debate on nominations, motions to proceed, and amendments without cloture.
The Status Quo
Rule XXII currently stipulates that a motion to invoke cloture (i.e., end debate) on any “measure, motion, or other matter pending before the Senate” requires “an affirmative vote of three-fifths of the senators duly chosen and sworn - except on a measure or motion to amend the Senate rules, in which case the necessary affirmative vote shall be two-thirds of the senators present and voting.”
Democrats (in 2013) and Republicans (in 2017) used the nuclear option to establish a precedent that effectively reduced the threshold for invoking cloture on nominations to a simple majority without changing Rule XXII.
The Implications
Eliminating cloture on nominations, motions to proceed, and amendments would prevent senators from using cloture to end debate on them. That is, the Senate would return to the process that existed before cloture applied to these questions. Senators could end debate only by attrition, unanimous consent, or by enforcing Rule XIX’s two-speech limit on filibustering senators.
None of these cloture alternatives guarantees an up-or-down vote on final passage over senators’ objections. Each is also more unpredictable than cloture’s clearly defined process. Attrition requires a Senate majority determined to wait out every senator who wants to speak. Unanimous consent gives every senator a veto over the Senate’s business. Rule XIX also requires a Senate majority and its presiding officer to strictly enforce the chamber’s rules, making filibustering harder.
Daines-Merkley could avoid these consequences and speed up floor debate in two different ways. First, it could lower Rule XXII’s three-fifths threshold for invoking cloture on motions to proceed and amendments to a simple majority. It could also amend Rule XXII to formally incorporate the nuclear option precedents for invoking cloture on nominations into the Senate’s standing rules.
Second, Daines-Merkley could keep cloture on nominations, motions to proceed, and amendments and create a separate motion to end debate on them like the previous question motion. The Senate’s original standing rules included a previous question motion from 1789 to 1806.
Eliminate the Intervening Day
Eliminate Rule XXII’s intervening-day requirement to expedite the cloture process.
The Status Quo
Rule XXII currently requires the Senate to wait one day between the filing of a cloture motion to end debate and voting on it. Specifically, the rule requires the Senate to vote on cloture one hour after it convenes “on the following calendar day but one.” For example, if senators file cloture on Monday, the Senate can’t vote on whether to invoke cloture until one hour after it convenes on Wednesday.
The Implications
Eliminating Rule XXII’s intervening-day requirement would speed up the cloture process. The proposal does not say when the Senate would vote on cloture once the intervening day is gone. The most natural reading is that the Senate would vote one hour after it convenes on the day following the filing of the cloture motion. On that reading, senators could file cloture on a measure, adjourn (or recess) the Senate, convene at midnight, and then vote on cloture at 1 am.
Daines-Merkley does not address how eliminating Rule XXII’s intervening-day requirement would affect its filing deadlines for amendments considered after cloture is invoked. Rule XXII currently requires senators to file first-degree amendments by 1 pm on the day after a cloture motion is filed (i.e., the intervening day) and second-degree amendments at least one hour before the cloture vote. These filing deadlines allow senators to identify all amendments that could be considered at a simple-majority vote threshold after cloture is invoked before they vote to limit their own debate and amendment rights.
Eliminating Rule XXII’s intervening-day requirement without also adjusting its amendment filing deadlines could restrict opportunities to file first-degree amendments in response to legislation altered immediately before a cloture filing. For example, if the Senate adopted an amendment and filed cloture on the underlying bill as amended shortly before midnight on Monday and voted to invoke cloture at 1 am on Tuesday, Rule XXII’s filing deadline for first-degree amendments (1 pm on Tuesday) would arrive 12 hours after the Senate invoked cloture. In that scenario, senators might be unable to offer responsive first-degree amendments unless the filing deadlines were changed or an exception applied.
Reduce Post-Cloture Debate Time
Reduce the maximum amount of post-cloture debate time from 30 hours to 12 hours for legislation considered under the Senate’s existing rules.
The Status Quo
Rule XXII currently allows up to 30 hours of debate on legislation after the Senate invokes cloture. In 1979, the Senate amended Rule XXII to cap post-cloture debate time at 100 hours. Before that change, the rule imposed no overall limit on post-cloture debate. In 1986, the Senate reduced post-cloture debate time to 30 hours.
The Senate has also reduced post-cloture debate for nominations through standing orders and the nuclear option. In 2013, the Senate adopted a temporary standing order (S. Res. 15) that reduced post-cloture debate time to eight hours for most executive-branch nominations and two hours for district court nominations. In 2019, Republicans used the nuclear option to reduce post-cloture consideration to two hours for most executive-branch and judicial nominations (the change did not apply to Executive Schedule level I, circuit court, and Supreme Court nominations).
The Implications
Reducing post-cloture debate time to 12 hours, without limiting when cloture can be filed, does not guarantee more overall debate. Daines-Merkley could reduce debate time compared to the status quo and, in doing so, limit senators’ amendment opportunities.
Combined with the intervening-day rule change, reducing post-cloture debate time to 12 hours would substantially shorten the cloture process. For example, senators could file cloture on a bill shortly before midnight, vote to invoke cloture at 1 am, and vote on final passage as soon as 1 pm that same day (assuming the Senate adjourns or recesses and then convenes at midnight, and uses all 12 hours of post-cloture debate time). That is approximately 13 hours from filing to final passage. Under the Senate’s existing rules, the fastest the Senate can proceed from a cloture filing to final passage under comparable assumptions is approximately 55 hours - 25 hours between a late-night filing and a 1 am cloture vote two calendar days later, plus 30 hours of post-cloture debate. The 42-hour difference could incentivize majority leaders to file cloture earlier in the process to speed Senate action.
Suspension of the Rules
Daines-Merkley recommends creating a Senate version of the House suspension calendar to expedite consideration of committee-reported legislation. The proposal includes three reforms:
Create a Suspension Calendar
Create a Suspension Motion
Expedite Floor Consideration of Legislation Under Suspension
Taken together, the proposed changes would allow the Senate to pass individual bills, groups of bills considered separately, and groups of bills considered jointly with a single vote. The chair and ranking member of the committee of jurisdiction could jointly offer a motion to suspend the rules. The motion would identify the bill(s) to be considered under suspension and how much time senators could debate it. Debate on the new motion to suspend the rules would be limited to one hour, and its adoption would require a two-thirds majority. The Senate would then consider the bill(s) exactly as the committee reported it. Floor amendments would be prohibited. Final passage would also require a two-thirds vote.
Create a Suspension Calendar
Create a new Suspension Calendar for committee-reported legislation.
The Status Quo
Under Rule XIV, bills reported from committee are placed on the Senate’s Calendar of Business (i.e., the legislative calendar). Rule VIII then allows any senator to move to proceed to legislation on that calendar for consideration on the Senate floor.
The Implications
Daines-Merkley does not explain how the new Suspension Calendar would interact with the Senate’s existing Calendar of Business. That is, the proposal does not specify whether qualifying legislation would appear simultaneously on the Senate’s Calendar of Business and the new Suspension Calendar, or only on the Suspension Calendar. If the latter, the proposal is silent on whether the Senate could consider legislation listed on the Suspension Calendar but not on the Calendar of Business under the chamber’s existing rules.
Daines-Merkley also does not specify the procedural mechanism for placing qualifying legislation on the new Suspension Calendar. The proposal is similarly silent on how committee amendments would be incorporated into the qualifying legislation without Senate action. Finally, the proposal does not specify whether senators could divide the question and force separate votes on individual bills when a motion to suspend the rules includes several of them.
Create a Suspension Motion
Create a new motion to suspend the rules to consider qualifying legislation on the Suspension Calendar under special rules that limit debate and amendments. The chair and ranking member of the committee of jurisdiction would jointly offer the motion.
The motion could include a single bill on the suspension calendar, several bills considered separately, or several bills considered jointly and passed by a single vote. The motion would also specify how much debate time the bill(s) would get.
The Status Quo
Rule V currently allows any senator to move to suspend the Senate’s rules after providing one day's written notice. The rule requires a two-thirds vote of senators present and voting to adopt the motion.
The Implications
Creating a new suspension motion without incorporating Rule V’s existing notice and lay-over requirements would reduce the time it currently takes for the Senate to suspend its rules. It does not, however, guarantee that senators will have sufficient time to review qualifying legislation before voting on whether to consider it under suspension. The time the proposal allows to review the bill(s) in question will disadvantage senators who are not members of the committee of jurisdiction and who have not had a prior opportunity to review or change it.
Daines-Merkley differs from the Rule V motion in several additional ways. Unlike the Rule V motion to suspend the rules, which is debatable, the new suspension motion is debatable for only one hour. It also specifies how much debate time each bill receives, whether the Senate considers one bill or several.
The proposal allows only the chair and ranking member of the committee of jurisdiction to make the motion. It does not require additional senators to sign on before they file it. In doing so, Daines-Merkley gives the chair and ranking member of a committee greater control over Senate consideration of bills than they have under the Senate’s existing rules. It would also disadvantage the 98 other senators, who would have no explicit say in whether or when the process begins, and bills placed directly on the Calendar of Business via Rule XIV, which bypass committee and so could never qualify for suspension under the proposal.
Expedite Floor Consideration of Bills Under Suspension
Expedite the Senate’s consideration of bills considered under suspension by automatically incorporating committee amendments into qualifying bills, prohibiting floor amendments, and limiting debate.
The Status Quo
Under existing rules and precedents, senators generally may debate legislation and offer first- and second-degree amendments while it is pending on the Senate floor, subject to applicable restrictions, the availability of amendment slots, and any unanimous consent agreements. A committee-reported amendment is not automatically incorporated into the underlying bill merely because the committee recommended it. The Senate must adopt committee amendments before incorporating them into the bill. Rule XXII permits a three-fifths majority of senators duly chosen and sworn to invoke cloture on legislation and generally limits further consideration to 30 hours, with restrictions on amendments after cloture. The Senate can also limit debate and amendments by unanimous consent.
The Implications
Expediting consideration of bills under suspension by empowering the chair and ranking member of a committee to unilaterally dictate how long senators can debate qualifying legislation does not guarantee senators sufficient time to review qualifying legislation before voting on final passage.
Daines-Merkley would limit debate on the new motion to suspend the rules to one hour. It would also allow the chair and ranking member of the committee of jurisdiction to determine how much time senators could debate the qualifying bill(s). However, the proposal does not specify whether the one-hour cap applies only to debate on the motion itself or also caps the total time for debate on the listed bill(s). Consequently, the chair and ranking member could allocate very little debate time to a particular bill (or any amount below an hour), provided the motion otherwise satisfied the proposed requirements.
Under the Senate’s existing rules and precedents, every senator has an opportunity to offer amendments on the floor (subject to applicable procedural restrictions). Daines-Merkley would eliminate that opportunity for qualifying legislation and incorporate that limitation into the Senate’s standing rules. In doing so, the proposal would give committee members greater influence over a bill’s provisions at the expense of senators who do not serve on the committee. Senators could approve or reject the committee-reported bill(s). But they could not change it. The proposal therefore effectively transforms the Senate floor into a rubber stamp for committee-reported bills. The committee’s decision would be final on the contents of a qualifying bill(s) unless the Senate rejected the suspension motion or considered the bill(s) under different procedures. (Note: Daines-Merkley does not specify whether the Senate can consider bills listed on the Suspension Calendar under its existing rules.)
Daines-Merkley would require a two-thirds vote both to adopt the motion to suspend the rules and to pass the bill(s) considered under it. The proposal does not specify whether the threshold is two-thirds of senators duly chosen and sworn or two-thirds of senators present and voting. If all 100 senators are sworn in, the first would require 67 votes regardless of how many senators participate. The second would require 67 votes if all 100 senators voted but fewer if fewer senators participated. For example, if 51 senators were present and voting, two-thirds of them would be 34 votes.
Authorizing Legislation
Daines-Merkley recommends establishing a one-day fast-track process for considering “robustly bipartisan” legislation reported by a Senate committee. The proposal includes three reforms:
Create a Fast-Track Process for Committee-Reported Authorizing Legislation
Limit Debate and Floor Amendments
Require a Simple Majority Vote for the New Motion and Final Passage
Taken together, the proposed changes would allow a committee chair and ranking member, with the support of 14 additional senators, to bring qualifying legislation to the floor without relying on the majority leader to schedule its consideration. The qualifying legislation would receive up to six hours of debate time, and floor amendments would be restricted. Final passage would require a simple majority vote.
Create a Fast-Track Process for Committee-Reported Authorizing Legislation
Create a new motion to bring “robustly bipartisan” committee-reported legislation to the Senate floor for consideration under fast-track procedures.
The proposal defines “robustly bipartisan” legislation as legislation reported with either the support of a majority of the committee’s majority-party members and a majority of its minority-party members or at least five members from each party. The motion would require 16 signatures, including the chair and ranking member of the committee reporting the qualifying legislation and at least three additional senators from each party.
The majority leader would then have 15 session days to bring the qualifying legislation specified in the new motion to the Senate floor. If the majority leader does not act, the new motion would ripen automatically on the 16th session day.
The Implications
Creating a fast-track motion for qualifying legislation would strengthen authorizing committees’ ability to bring legislation to the Senate floor. In doing so, however, it would give a minority of senators greater influence over Senate business and undermine the majority leader’s current ability, itself a deferential norm, to set the Senate’s schedule. The proposal also says nothing about key details that would change how the new fast-track process would operate in practice.
Daines-Merkley defines “robustly bipartisan” committee-reported legislation as receiving support from a majority of a panel’s majority-party members and a majority of its minority-party members, or at least five senators from each party. The alternative requirements would allow some committee-reported legislation to qualify as “robustly bipartisan” with fewer than five votes from each party. The majority-of-each-party standard is the lower bar on committees with small memberships. For example, the Ethics Committee has six members, equally divided between the majority and minority parties. Under the majority-of-each-party standard, authorizing legislation would qualify for expedited floor consideration with support from just two members of each party. The five-vote standard is the lower bar on large committees. On a committee with at least ten members from each party, five votes from each party are fewer than a majority of each party’s members. As few as ten senators could therefore qualify reported authorizing legislation for consideration under the new fast-track process on the Senate floor.
Because eligibility depends on a committee vote, the fast-track process would also exclude legislation placed directly on the Calendar of Business via Rule XIV. Those bills bypass committee and so could never qualify. As a result, Daines-Merkley would favor committee-reported legislation over measures individual senators place on the calendar without committee consideration.
Daines-Merkley would also limit the majority leader’s ability to decide when bills reach the floor. It would give a subset of senators a new mechanism to force consideration of committee-reported authorizing legislation. For example, several committee chairs and ranking members could each file qualifying motions on different bills during the same period. If the majority leader did not schedule those bills within 15 session days. The stacked motions would then ripen beginning on the 16th session day one after another until the Senate had disposed of them all.
The proposal is silent on key details that would impact how the fast-track process operates in practice. For example, Daines-Merkley does not specify whether a session day means a calendar day or a legislative day, which may last for multiple calendar days. The distinction determines when the new motion ripens. For example, several committee chairs and ranking members could each file qualifying motions on different bills during the same period. If the majority leader did not schedule those bills within 15 session days. The stacked motions would then ripen beginning on the 16th session day one after another until the Senate had disposed of them all.
Limit Debate and Floor Amendments
Limit total debate time on qualifying legislation to six hours and restrict floor amendments to only those listed in the new motion.
The proposal requires listed amendments to have at least four cosponsors from each party. It prohibits considering additional amendments not listed in the motion unless the House votes by unanimous consent. The motion would also state how much debate time each listed amendment receives. Any amendments that had not received a vote when the overall six hours of debate time expired would be voted on immediately in succession (i.e., a vote-a-rama). The Senate would then vote on final passage of the underlying bill.
The Implications
Limiting debate and restricting floor amendments would limit senators who did not participate in the committee process from changing the provisions of qualifying authorizing legislation. The majority leader frequently prevents senators from offering amendments by filling the amendment tree. Daines-Merkley would create another way to prevent senators from offering amendments by empowering the 16 senators who sponsor the new motion to define the universe of amendments on the Senate floor. Other senators would need the sponsors’ support to include their amendments (or secure unanimous consent to offer them). That disadvantages amendments that sponsors oppose. As a result, Daines-Merkley would make it easier for a subset of senators to prevent their colleagues from offering amendments on the floor. It would also disadvantage senators whose policy preferences don’t attract the required bipartisan support even if their amendments could otherwise pass. The proposal therefore reduces the leverage that senators who do not sponsor the new motion have to get their amendments listed and in order.
Daines-Merkley does not guarantee minimum debate time on the underlying bill. Consequently, the 16 senators sponsoring the motion could allocate the entire six hours of debate time to listed amendments. In one scenario, the Senate could move from an amendment vote directly to final passage without additional debate on the bill itself. The proposal would therefore let a subset of senators decide not only which amendments their colleagues could offer, but also how much time the full Senate could spend debating the underlying bill.
The reform would make floor consideration of bipartisan committee-reported authorizing legislation more predictable and expedite final passage. However, it would also reduce opportunities for senators who weren't involved in negotiating the amendment list and don’t serve on the committee reporting the bill to participate meaningfully in the legislative process.
Require a Simple Majority Vote for the New Motion and Final Passage
Require a simple majority vote to adopt the motion to proceed under the new fast-track process and to pass the qualifying legislation.
The Implications
The proposal does not specify when the Senate would vote on the new fast-track motion on the 16th session day if the majority leader does not call up the qualifying legislation before then. If Daines-Merkley follows the cloture model, the Senate could vote on the motion one hour after it convenes on that day. The proposal also does not specify whether the ripened motion is itself the motion to proceed or whether senators would vote separately on the motion and on proceeding to the bill.
Appropriations Legislation
Daines-Merkley recommends establishing a two-day fast-track process for considering bipartisan appropriations bills. The new fast-track process would apply to individual appropriations bills reported by the Appropriations Committee and to minibus packages consisting of no more than three individual appropriations bills. The proposal includes four reforms:
Establish a Fast-Track Process for Appropriations Bills
Create a Separate Cloture Procedure and Limit Amendments
Require Varying Vote Thresholds for Floor Amendments and Final Passage
Pair House and Senate Appropriations Bills
Taken together, the proposed changes would limit debate on the motion to proceed to qualifying bills, create a separate cloture procedure for qualifying bills, and guarantee votes on a specified number of floor amendments before final passage. Although the proposal aims to facilitate floor consideration of bipartisan appropriations bills, it would also limit the number of senators who can offer amendments, and it would restrict the provisions of those amendments.
Establish a Fast-Track Process for Appropriations Bills
Create a fast-track process for bipartisan appropriations bills.
The proposal defines qualifying appropriations bills as individual appropriations bills reported by the Appropriations Committee with at least five votes from the panel’s majority-party members and five votes from its minority-party members. The committee could also combine up to three individual appropriations bills into a minibus package without losing eligibility for the expedited process.
Daines-Merkley would limit debate on the motion to proceed to qualifying appropriations bills to 30 minutes. Adoption of the motion to proceed would require a simple majority. The proposal does not create a new motion for this step or specify who may offer it.
The Implications
The proposal does not specify whether the new process would apply to all reported appropriations bills or only the 12 regular appropriations bills. For example, it does not specify whether continuing resolutions or supplemental appropriations bills will also qualify for expedited consideration if they receive the requisite bipartisan support in committee.
The requirement that qualifying bills be reported on a bipartisan committee vote addresses a problem that does not exist. The Appropriations Committee does not regularly vote on appropriations bills along party lines or in lopsided majorities. The main obstacles to passing appropriations bills arise after committee action (or inaction), when senators disagree about which bills to consider, which amendments to allow, and whether to invoke cloture. A fast-track process aimed at those post-committee disagreements would resolve them largely by making it harder for non-appropriators to debate and amend those bills.
The proposal also says nothing about how the 30-minute limit interacts with its separate reform eliminating cloture on motions to proceed. If Daines-Merkley makes all motions to proceed non-debatable, a separate 30-minute limit for qualifying appropriations bills would be unnecessary unless the proposal expressly preserves limited debate for them. Alternatively, it could eliminate cloture on motions to proceed considered under the Senate’s existing rules while creating a separate limited-debate procedure for qualifying appropriations bills. The implementing language would have to reconcile the two recommendations.
Create a Separate Cloture Procedure and Limit Floor Amendments
Create a special cloture motion for qualifying appropriations bills.
The motion would require the chair's and ranking member’s signatures, plus at least three additional senators from each party. As a result, as few as eight senators could initiate the special cloture process. All eight senators could be Appropriations Committee members. The special cloture motion would also have to list the amendments senators can offer during post-cloture consideration.
Limit the number of floor amendments senators can offer to appropriations bills, the provisions of those amendments, and how long senators can debate them.
The proposal would cap the number of amendments senators can offer to qualifying appropriations bills considered under the fast-track process at 20 (10 majority amendments and 10 minority amendments). It would also limit the substance of listed amendments. It would require amendments to be germane to the underlying appropriations bill. In addition, the listed amendments could only increase or decrease funding for a line item and could not authorize new programs. Read literally, that language appears to exclude amendments that limit the use of funds and amendments that address directed scoring provisions (e.g., adding or striking budget gimmicks), because those amendments do not increase or decrease a line item. After cloture, the majority and minority parties would dispose of amendments in alternating order. Debate on each amendment would be limited to five minutes. Assuming all 20 amendments receive the maximum debate time, senators would spend no more than 100 minutes debating them (not including the time needed to vote on them) before voting on final passage.
The Implications
Under Daines-Merkley, the special cloture motion would ripen on the next day instead of after an intervening day. The proposal does not explain why the special cloture process needs an exception to Rule XXII’s intervening-day requirement if it separately eliminates the intervening day for all cloture motions.
The reforms designed to limit floor amendments would make it easier for a subset of senators and one committee to decide which amendments the full Senate may consider. The proposal does not specify how the 20 amendments would be selected or whether senators who do not sponsor the new motion could include their own amendments. Daines-Merkley appears to empower the eight senators who sponsor the new motion to determine which amendments may receive votes on the Senate floor. The restriction would reduce other senators’ ability to influence appropriations bills, particularly if they do not serve on the Appropriations Committee or can’t persuade the motion’s sponsors to include their amendments.
The proposal’s restrictions on how the listed amendments can change the underlying appropriations bill would appear to prevent the full Senate from changing some of that bill’s provisions. For example, appropriations bills routinely include provisions that prohibit executive-branch officials from using appropriated funds for particular activities. As described, Daines-Merkley appears to prohibit floor amendments related to those provisions because they do not adjust a line-item appropriation. It would also appear to prevent senators from addressing budget gimmicks and directed scoring provisions in committee-reported appropriations bills. If read that way, Daines-Merkley would give the Appropriations Committee greater control over the appropriations process by preventing non-appropriators from changing non-funding provisions in a bill without unanimous consent.
Require Varying Vote Thresholds for Floor Amendments and Final Passage
Require a simple majority to adopt listed appropriations amendments cosponsored by at least four senators from each party and 60 votes to adopt listed amendments without that level of bipartisan support.
Require a simple-majority vote on final passage after the Senate disposes of the listed amendments.
The Implications
Daines-Merkley would undermine the long-standing norm of Senate egalitarianism by establishing different vote thresholds for amendments based solely on the party labels of the senators cosponsoring them. For example, an amendment supported by 55 senators would fail if it lacked four cosponsors from each party. Conversely, an amendment with the requisite number of cosponsors from each party could be adopted with the same 55 votes. This distinction would disadvantage amendments supported predominantly by one party, even if they could otherwise command a Senate majority.
The 60-vote threshold required for partisan amendments is not new. Since the 109th Congress, the Senate has routinely conditioned amendment adoption on 60 votes by unanimous consent. Daines-Merkley would incorporate that practice into the Senate’s standing rules for amendments without the required number of bipartisan cosponsors. In doing so, it would reward amendments that secure bipartisan support before floor consideration while making it harder for senators to build winning coalitions through debate and amendment on the Senate floor.
Pair House and Senate Appropriations Bills
Develop a process that pairs individual Senate appropriations bills with their House counterparts, or a Senate minibus with a House minibus.
The proposal says the rule change would address Rule XVI challenges related to policy provisions in appropriations bills. It identifies one possible solution: start with the Senate bill, amend it, and then use a special motion to attach it to a House vehicle.
The Implications
Daines-Merkley does not specify how this process would operate. Rule XVI, among other things, prohibits legislation (i.e., policy provisions) on appropriations bills. It is unclear how the special motion to attach Senate text to a House vehicle would work, or how the proposal’s amendment restrictions would apply when the Senate considers a House-passed bill or substitutes its own text for the House’s. Those details matter because the restrictions would apply to legislation that may already contain policy provisions, funding limitations, or other language that senators could not readily change under the fast-track process.
The Takeaway
Daines-Merkley aims to make the Senate more productive and deliberative by expediting floor consideration of bipartisan legislation and increasing the number of guaranteed amendment votes over the status quo. However, its proposed rule changes would achieve these objectives at the expense of individual senators’ ability to participate meaningfully in the legislative process.
The proposal’s central tradeoff is between empowering committees and empowering the full Senate. Daines-Merkley would give committee chairs and ranking members, along with a small number of their colleagues, greater control over which bills reach the Senate floor, which amendments senators could offer, and how long they could debate them. In doing so, the proposal would shift influence over the legislative process away from the full Senate and toward a subset of its members.
Daines-Merkley seeks to increase the number of amendments considered on the Senate floor. Yet its proposed rule changes would also make it easier to prevent senators from offering amendments in the first place. The result could be more amendment votes but fewer opportunities for individual senators to offer amendments of their choosing.
The proposal would also favor senators whose policy preferences attract bipartisan support over those that do not. The senators best positioned to meet its requirements are those closest to each party’s center. Senators from the left and right, who are less likely to attract bipartisan cosponsors, would find it harder to secure votes for their amendments. In doing so, Daines-Merkley would qualify the Senate’s long-standing norm of senatorial equality by making senators’ procedural opportunities depend on their committee assignments and their ability to secure bipartisan support.